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Companies do not
have the resources
to analyse every
potential failure
that faces the
supply chain
more comprehensive way of looking at cyber-risks
in supply chains is required, particularly when
considering the increasing complexity of logistics
networks and their exposure to unexpected disruptions.
This article explores why current risk assessment
methods are insufficient, and provides an analogy for
understanding the dynamic effects in a company.
Increased complexity in supply chains is exposing
organisations to new risks. Many of these risks originate
from the increasing dependence on information
technology (IT) by competitive logistics networks.
Organisations are being damaged by the resulting
disruption of operations, as well as loss of company
data, intellectual property and organisational value.
Studies have shown costs at over $550 billion annually.1
These disruptions are challenging the way we organise
our operational activities, as well as the way we manage
relationships with our partners. It also signifies that the
transparent and rapid access to logistics resources
enabled by IT is also a platform used by intruders for
their own benefit.
The diversity of potential disruptions means that
traditional risks assessment tools are impractical.
Companies do not have the resources to analyse every
potential failure, and to update the assessments as new
risks appear, or existing risks change.
Our research at the Technical University of Denmark
(DTU) is leading us to challenge the traditional risk
analysis used in complex supply chains. Improvements
can be achieved by moving from a static analysis, based
on analysing reliability of components, to a dynamic
analysis, based on control of vulnerabilities in the
organisation – see Figure 1.
Although this novel approach requires a change in the
way these risks are understood, it can create a
comprehensive way of understanding the supply chain
structure, and for improving supply chain reaction and
recovery (resilience) when an unexpected cyberattack
occurs.
Shortcomings in current approaches
The Federal Aviation Administration in the USA recently
identified more than 100 methods for assessing risks2,
several of which are traditionally used in logistics
networks. These methods are largely based on the
premise that an undesirable event is caused by a chain
of other preceding events. These methods are based on
the assumption that these events can be decomposed,
and that this decomposition allows for the independent
analysis of each component, which does not influence
the outcome. The process is known as analytic
reduction. These analyses view this undesirable event
and go backwards through the events that led to it, until
the event that is considered the originator of the chain
(the so-called root cause), is identified. This is the case
of methods such as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA) or Failure Mode and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA), and are also known as backward-looking
analyses. If instead an analysis is made to reveal all the
possible chains of events in which something can go
wrong, methods such as Failure Tree Analysis (FTA) are
used. These are known as forward-looking analysis
methods. Several other forward-looking methods are
also widely used, such as Hazard and Operability
Analysis (HAZOP) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA).
All of these methods follow the chain-of-failure-event
causality model, which can be best represented through
A
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the analogy of a row of falling dominoes. There is an
initial domino, labelled the root cause, that represents a
single event. It could be a human error or a component
failure. This error then propagates through the system,
leading to other component failures and eventually
making the last domino fall, where the problem is
experienced – see Figure 2.
This family of methods have been widely used since
their invention in the 1950s. They are popular due to
their relative simplicity, and are effective in systems with
technical components, as well as in simple systems
involving both technical components and people, the
so-called sociotechnical systems. A traditional way of
quantifying cyber-risks would be to identify all the ways
a logistics network could fail (reliability analysis) or be
subject to cyberattack. This is best done in close
interaction with an experienced team from different
parts of the supply chain under analysis. The team will
then agree on the likelihood of occurrence for each of
these possible failures (probability), and an approximate
amount of money lost if these failures were to occur
(severity). Impact would then be probability x severity
for each of these failures. By multiplying these two
factors, a ranking of failures can be obtained, the events
with highest impact can be identified and actions can be
concentrated on elimination or mitigation of these risks.
Our research is leading us to question several
assumptions about how new risks such as cyber-risks can
be managed, due to the increased occurrence of
different types of cyberattacks with potentially harmful
effects on supply chain performance. We have thus
searched for new ways of understanding these risks, and
that has enabled us to develop practical proposals that
could be useful to practitioners.
The traditional way of quantifying risks has several
shortcomings. One of them has already been
mentioned above. We will additionally analyse four
other shortcomings3: reliability vs safety, subjective
choice, systemic effects and dynamic behaviour.
Reliability vs safety
By focusing only on the performance of individual parts
of the supply chain, there is the danger of confusing
safety with reliability, meaning that it is generally
assumed that if the components of the supply network
function well, then the supply network is safe. This belief
crumbles when errors occur in supply networks, where
all components worked as expected, even sometimes
because all components worked as expected. This can
happen particularly where some type of redundancy has
been built into the system, or where controllers (human
or automatic) do not understand adequately what
19
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actually happens in the process. Redundancy can work
well in simple mechanical or electrical systems, but when
it is applied to decision networks, it can lead, for
example, to a double call, where two different people
make contradicting decisions: a major problem in
situations where urgent action is needed. Additionally, if
the control actions in the procedures do not represent
what should be done, a correctly functioning control
procedure could lead to an unwanted disruption.
Subjective choice: who does the analysis?
In traditional risk assessment methods, there is a
subjective choice of the chain of events. The list of
potential failures – the chain of events leading to this
failure, as well as the relationships between the events in
the chain, right down to the root cause – is highly
dependent on who is conducting the analysis. This can
lead to several types of bias. If the participants are in
management positions, without thorough knowledge of
operations, then some relevant operational sources of
accidents will be absent from the list. Root causes may
be selected, just because they are politically acceptable,
and other potential explanations may not be explored,
because they could be an embarrassment for the
organisation. Many times this search also ends with
some type of operator error or lack of training. Jens
Rasmussen, researcher, Risø (present DTU), mentioned
in the 1980s that it is indeed very difficult to analyse
through a perceived human error, and therefore the
analysis stops there.
Systemic effects: look at the wider picture
Only a very limited chain of events is taken into account
in these traditional methods, and factors not directly
included in a chain of events are excluded. The
explanation usually considers the events that
immediately led to the loss and systemic factors are not
considered. Systemic factors can be the consequences
the decision has in other parts of the organisation,
affecting and counteracting the original decision
through feedback loops. This normally does not happen
immediately – see Figure 3. The systemic effects can
also include policy decisions in the company, leading to
the unwanted disruptions.
A proper understanding of the required behaviour and
the ability to withstand disruptions from cyberattacks
and regain normal operating conditions (cyber-resilience)
is hidden in the traditional methods. The reaction by the
company, when having to cope with a cyberattack, will
normally be a series of actions, using resources present
in the company. These actions will develop over time,
and the stability of the operation will eventually be
restored. This will not happen immediately and it will
take some time. This means that cyber-resilience is, in
fact, a dynamic behaviour of the supply chain, and as
such it requires a way to deal with these dynamics. Let
us look at this more closely.
Dynamics: businesses vs cars
Dynamics can be better understood by comparing a
manufacturing company subject to cyberattacks with a
car on the road. A company manager would be
equivalent to the car’s driver. Cyber-risks coming
towards this company can be represented as obstacles
on the road coming towards the car. The car has several
controls that can be used by the driver to avoid these
obstacles, such as the steering wheel, the accelerator
and the brakes. In the same way, the company has also
some controls that can be used by the manager to direct
the company development, such as setting strategic
objectives, investment in training or incentive structures
towards collaboration with suppliers. The car has a mass
that results in inertial effects. Due to the risk of a crash,
it is not possible or convenient for the driver to change
the car’s direction suddenly, or accelerate, or stop the
car suddenly. These inertial effects are also one of the
characteristics for real systems, known as dynamic
effects. The company has also inertial effects such as the
number of employees, the total accounts payable or the
number of electronic orders for products. This means
that a manager cannot make sudden changes in the
controls, in the case of risk of a cyberattack, without
other consequences.
A driver avoids an obstacle in the road by using the
controls – for example, activating the brakes at a
forthcoming stop sign. A novice driver might attempt to
break too late, thrusting him forward with a jolt: a not
always gentle reminder of the inertial effect of our own
mass in movement. In the case of the company, a
manager, attempting to avoid the effects of a
cyberattack will use the controls at his or her disposal. 
A novice manager may attempt to change strategic
objectives too quickly or change the incentive structures
radically, thereby creating an organisational jolt.
Unknown inertial effects
Some important differences come to light in this
analogy, which we have defined as differences of
management and differences of design. Drivers
normally start driving (managing) the car from a resting
position, and with training the driver will gradually
explore increasing levels of driving difficulty. In the case
of the company, the manager will usually be appointed
to the role, with the company already ‘in movement’ 
at an undetermined speed. He will have a series of
controls. Some of them will be familiar from previous
experience, and some might be new controls,
implemented by a predecessor.
There are different organisational masses, which the
manager will not necessarily know about and will have to
20
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discover by trial and error. Moreover, the manager will
not have experience with the inertial effects that these
available controls will have on the company. Finally, in
the same way drivers are taught in the driving school
about existing cars and driving conditions, managers are
trained in business schools about existing companies
and business conditions.
Another important and very relevant difference is one of
design. The car has a structure, developed and
improved over time by a team of specialists. They
understand the effects this car structure has on the car’s
behaviour, with special attention to dynamic effects. The
structure of a company will usually not have been
designed, but rather replicated initially from other
working models, maybe grown through acquisition of
other companies (inorganic growth) or through its own
expansion (organic growth). Company structures are
therefore very likely to develop without any design
considerations to its dynamics.
Control view of risks
Taking the car analogy further, resilience, or the ability to
return to normal operations after disruptions, can be
then understood as the ability of the company to adjust
it course (its processes) by using its control structures – see
Figure 4. Resilience would then be reflected in how well
this control structure works by:
• How well and timely sensors measure the current
process
• How well and timely we act on the process with our
actuators when there is something to be done
• How well and timely our supply chain can translate
what it is sensing into what it has to do about it,
through its controller
This is an ongoing activity, since the supply process is
constantly encountering different working conditions
that have to be detected and be adapted to
Steps to implement the control view
Supply chain cyber-resilience through the control view of
cyber-risks can be achieved by the following general
steps:
• Identify what the company will consider as
undesirable disruptions to the supply chain – identify
potential accidents
• Identify the mix of conditions in the current supply
network that would lead to the undesirable
disruptions specified in the previous step – identify
hazards
• Define the boundaries of what is in control and out 
of the control of the company – identify supply
system boundaries, controls and masses present in
the system
• Brainstorm about how each potential disruption
identified in the first step could occur; this will lead 
to the identification of potential improved controls,
which should be in place – for example, how the
process is measured (sensors), organisational
structures (actuators), or action plans for crisis
management teams (controllers)
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